

Before replying to my requests, President Benes said that there was something he could not understand about Zionist policies. He ^{FELT} thought that the transfer of the Palestinian Arabs to Iraq or some other underpopulated Arab country could have provided the soundest solution for the Palestine problem. "Indeed," Dr. Benes went on, "I spoke about it several times to Dr. Weizmann (Dr. Chaim Weizmann, President of the World Zionist Organization, and later the first President of the State of Israel - EKH) in London, but he had not been receptive at all to this idea. We are now transferring the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia to Germany, and their number is twice the number of the Arabs you have in Palestine."

"As it happens," I answered the President, "you do not have to sell me on the transfer idea, because I have advocated this solution for several years."

ref 2:118

Ben-Horin's unpublished autobiography

SECRET

TELEG. ADDRESS:
PRODROME AMMAN.BRITISH LEGATION
AMMAN

REFERENCE No. S/852/46.

29th July, 1946.

6. He went on to say that, in his opinion, the only just and permanent solution lay in absolute partition with an exchange of populations; to leave Jews in an Arab State or Arabs in a Jewish State would lead inevitably to further trouble between the two peoples.

Ibrahim Pasha admitted that he would not be able to express this idea in public for fear of being called a traitor.

ref 2:120

Letter. Kirkbride to Wikeley

(TELEGRAMS TO BE DESPATCHED IN CYPHER).

From: Prodrome, Amman.
Dated: 23rd August, 1946.

SECRET (80)

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 00039 dated 23rd August, repeated to Cairo 9, Beirut 7, Baghdad 4, Jeddah 4 and Jerusalem.

Your telegram No. 49 of 20th August, 1946. Secmy
telegram 00029 of 14th August.

King Abdullah and Prime Minister of Transjordan both consider that partition followed by an exchange of populations is only practical solution to the Palestine problem.

ref 2:121

PRODROME.

הצעה

היות ואתם היהודים רוצים רק את א"י, והיות
והצלתם לסמא את עיני האנגלים המעמידים לשירותכם
את צבאותיהם וציייהם, ואת כל היקר להם למען הוציא
מיד הערבים החמים מפשע את ארצם, הריני מציע שימסרו
לידכם את כל א"י על משכנותיה ושרותיה ומטגיה וקברותיה
וכת אוצרות הערבים הקדושים והחמריים, יתר מכל הנני
מציע שיצאו מנה כל ערביי א"י אשר יחולקו בין הארצות
הערביות השכנות. תמורת זאת יצאו כל היהודים הגרים
בארצות ערב ויבואו לא"י - הדרך תעודתם אשר בה יישאו
בהלב ורבע". א"י שלכם תהיה גדולה ומבודדת משאר הארצות
הערביות באמצעות סכרים "כסכרי גוז ומנוב" כדי שאתם
לא תראו את מני הערבים והערבים לא יראו את מניכם.
אנו הערבים מוכנים לקבל כל עצמנו את הקרבן הגדול
הזה למען שלומכם וקצוץ מזוריכם ובגלל סבל הדורות
שעבר עליכם ביטור וגרוסיה ובמקומות אחרים. אנו
עושים כפי זה רק מרצוננו הטוב ומתוך דחיית אנושים
בלבד.

את חילומי האוכלוסיה יח להוציא לפועל באותה
הדרך שבה החליטו תורכיה ויוון את אוכלוסייהן. אריך
שתמלגה בכל ועדות מיוחדות שתעטוקנה בהיסול רכוש
היהודים והערבים ותקבענה את איוורוי השיכון ההדושים.
אך על פי שבתיחלה יתעוררו קהיית גדולים, הנח יח
לקוות שלבסוף הם ייושבו ואז יושבו בא"י הבטחון, השלום
והשקט.

אני ירא אמנם שהערבים לא יסכימו למתרון העושי
הזה ושהם ירגזו למחשבה בלבד על עזיבת א"י ומסירת
מקומותיהם הקדושים. אך אף על פי כן הנני לוקח על
עמי את התפקיד לשכנעם שיקבלו את המתרון ושיצאו בכל
ההסדרים הקשים הללו. על היהודים רק לרסמו על הסכמתם
ואז אפתח מסדרי תעמולה בכל הארצות הערביות כדי לחשיב
את הסכמת הערבים למתרון האסור ולבטוחו, ואין צורך
בחתערבות בריטניה וצבאותיה בבעיה הזאת.

כמו כן הנני מונה לאחי הערבים שיטחינו ויכבשו
את רגשותיהם עד שנשבע את דעת היהודים על המקח והמסחר
הזה אשר בו גופל בחלקם כל הרוח ובחלקנו רק החמסד.

אשר, 2.4.8

— אלה

הידוע. אלה בקרר האלה - כמוט נאק
קראת אב קירו (בתכוסם הלוטת) נאכור
אחילא פה אמת אולא) קענר אול אמת גולדקין
פלוס: אלת סהירוק אול אמת קורן וואנא
היהיו אדנה מאורק ופנאיה, אמת אהסור אהא
אול א פלוס אגין הכנת אול בקעו דורו -
נפלה לוטתו רמת, אפס, אול הוה אולדה אמת
אגסה אהרוב אולאיה נמתה.

ref 2:124

Letter. Ben-Gurion to Shertok
regarding Bullitt's transfer plan

A CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTION

By WILLIAM C. BULLITT

Former U. S. Ambassador to France and Russia

Aaronsohn's Plan


Since Aaron Aaronsohn's death I have often felt that I was in a minority of one on the question of Palestine. His opinions were my opinions, and for a long time there seemed to be few, if any, who shared them.

Aaron's proposal was that, while Palestine should become a Jewish State, the vast valley of Iraq, watered by the Tigris and the Euphrates, should be turned once more by irrigation into the garden of the world—which it once had been—and that the Arabs of Palestine should be offered there lands far richer than the lands they owned in Palestine, and that as many as possible of them should be persuaded to emigrate to Iraq.

ref 2:125

Code, Cypher or Clear? Code.		C.S.O. 67	
TELEGRAM			
From		To	
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR PALESTINE, TRANS-JORDAN.		Commissioner, Berbera Radio, Somaliland.	
Despatched 26.5.36.		OPP. 569-3000-12.2.36	
No. 337.			
<p>I am repatriating some 20 Somalis by first available steamer. It is urgently necessary in present circumstances that they should leave Palestine on general grounds and in their own interests. I accordingly trust that Somaliland Government will not demure to reimbursing expenses of repatriation and relief grants issued. Particulars follow by mail.</p>			

ref 2:131



JUNE, 1941

TWENTY-FIVE CENTS

The Conditions for Zionist Success

by Norman Angell

LET US take first of all what we would like to see take place. It is surely this: that Palestine should become a self-governing Jewish state, a true homeland of the Jews, master of its own immigration policy, open to development without the restrictions and complications imposed by the presence of an Arab population nearly twice as great as the Jewish population; and by the fears and incompetencies and even hostilities of the mandatory or guardian power; and that such a Palestine should have secure defense. Without this last condition the others are not of much value. That is what we would like to see.

The method I believe to be pursued in Palestine is not any enforced removal of the Arab population—that would be wrong and suicidal. But the Arab world is a great one, containing vast areas completely undeveloped. If some of that Arab area outside Palestine were developed and offered to Palestinian Arabs, the conditions might be made so attractive that you might secure a voluntary Arab emigration in large numbers on to land developed for the specific purpose of inducing them to go there, so that side by side with an increase of Jewish immigration into Palestine might go an Arab emigration, until Palestine had become a predominantly Jewish state in its population make-up. But I emphasize particularly the importance of making this a purely voluntary migration.

We know too well the obstacles to the realization of Zionist aims: the presence of a major Arab population in Palestine itself, the fact that that population makes part of a widely scattered Arab population and of a Moslem world still more widely spread; populations so situated as to be able to make difficulties for the mandatory power in carrying out the aims of Zionism. There are, of course, the other obstacles already indicated—bureaucratic incompetence, anti-Semitic prejudice, lack of imagination in grappling with the problem, administrative timidity and a tendency everywhere to solve problems by postponing them, passing the buck, evading them. But the major concrete difficulty is the Arab position and the relation of that position to British security, or, what in practice often amounts to the same thing, British opinion about the needs of Britain's security.

ref 2:139

THE TIMES FRIDAY SEPTEMBER 11 1936

THE PALESTINIAN DILEMMA

A LAND FOR THE ARABS

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES—

Sir,—I think I shall express what many Englishmen must feel as they follow, day by day, the shocking incidents in Palestine if I say that the problem seems so insoluble just because both sides, both Arabs and Jews, have so strong a case. Was it Lessing who said that the essence of tragedy was not a clash between right and wrong, but a clash between two rights? It is really idle to argue, on behalf of Jewish immigration, that the Arabs have profited economically from the immigration so far because the Arabs, looking ahead, must see that if the immigration continues, they will cease to own a great part of the land where their fathers have lived for many generations. No people, the advocates of the Arabs urge, can quietly see another people come in and take possession of its country.

On the other hand, it is idle for the advocates of the Arabs to ask us to look upon Palestine as a country belonging to the Arabs in the same way that England belongs to the English or France to the French. Palestine is a wholly peculiar case. Christian peoples, Jews and Arabs, all have, in different ways, sentimental and historical attachments to it. The Palestinian Arabs are only part of the great Arab people, and that people has, outside Palestine, wide lands for habitation. Those Jews for whom life has been made unlivable in some European countries have no home ready to receive them elsewhere. It may seem impossible to find any issue from the present conflict which would not inflict grievous wrong either upon the Arabs or upon the Jews.

Yet there is perhaps a solution which, if men were reasonable beings, would be within the range of hope. Iraq in antiquity—or Babylonia, as it was called by Greeks and Romans—was one of the world's chief granaries: great and ancient cities, endless fields and gardens, were to be seen beside its innumerable canals. The country continued rich and populous in the palmy days of Mohammedan culture. Its population was exterminated by the Mongol invaders in the thirteenth century; its irrigation system fell into decay, and much of it has remained to this day an empty desolation. In a little book which had some circulation during the War ("The Land of the Two Rivers") I pointed out that the great difficulty in the way of restoring Iraq to something of its former splendour was the sparseness of its present population. In antiquity it is calculated that Babylonia had a population of 7,000,000 or 8,000,000; the population to-day—some of it semi-nomad—is about 2,500,000.

It would be no good to restore the old system of canals, so long as there are not enough hands to keep them in repair and cultivate the fields. The existing population is Arab, and any congenial addition to it from outside would have to be Arab. Thus we see to-day the teasing anomaly: in Palestine an Arab population of some 820,000, who stand in the way of the Jews' need to re-enter their ancient home, and just the other side of the desert, 500 miles to the east, a land of immense possibilities crying out for an additional Arab population of 4,000,000 or 5,000,000.

There could never, of course, be any question of bringing pressure upon the Palestinian Arabs to emigrate. Any Arab who shifted his domicile from Palestine to Iraq would have to do so quite voluntarily. But it might be possible for the Iraq Government to offer any Palestinian Arab a holding in Iraq larger and richer than his present holding in Palestine, and, if so, it would seem humanly probable that many Palestinian Arabs would like to close with the bargain. If, under such conditions, the bulk of the Palestinian Arabs in course of time crossed the desert into Iraq, one would suppose that all parties would have reason to feel pleased. The King of Iraq would have secured an addition to his people badly needed for its rise to new greatness; the Arab world would have a ground of pride in seeing the waste places built up again in the most illustrious seat of its old culture; the individual Arab immigrants would have exchanged their old lands for better ones among their own Arab kinsmen; the hard-driven Jews would find space for their home in the promised land. No doubt it may be objected that in order to make such favourable offers to the Palestinian Arabs the Iraq Government would need to lay out a considerable amount of capital, which might be difficult, even if an ample return could be expected later on when the development of the country had progressed. As to that it would seem reasonable to expect the Jewish community to find a good part of the money at the outset for Iraq. Everyone seemingly would gain by the arrangement. But is it not to put human reasonableness too high to hope, on that ground, in regard to any arrangement, that it will be actually carried into effect?

And there is one thing to note. Even if this would be the most satisfactory way out of present difficulties, it is a way which the Royal Commission could not be expected to suggest. It could not invite the Palestinian Arabs to the territory of an independent State outside the British Empire. The initiative would obviously have to be taken by the Government of Iraq.

EDWYN BEVAN.

The Athenaeum, Sept. 10.

SUMMARY OF THE WORLD FEDERATION PLAN

*an outline of a practical
and detailed plan for
world settlement*

by

ELY CULBERTSON

FIRST SOLUTION: Palestine shall become a Jewish sovereign state in the following manner:

- a. A large part of the Mohammedan and Christian populations of Palestine shall be transferred to another territory in the Middle East, where equivalent or better land and living conditions shall be provided, together with a reasonable bonus. This transfer shall be effected only with the consent of the groups concerned.
- b. The expenses of this transfer shall be borne, half by the Jewish state and half by The World Federation.

Comment: Despite the attachment of the Arabs to Palestine, it is reasonable to assume that a large number of both Arabs and Christians will consent to emigrate if sufficient inducement is offered. On the lands thus vacated, it will be possible to settle the hundreds of thousands of homeless Jews now herded in the ghettos of Europe, thus forming a Jewish majority in Palestine and a sovereign Jewish state.

ref 2:142

INSIDE ASIA

By JOHN GUNTHER

Perhaps amelioration will come some day—amelioration to the refugee problem also—in the form of an exchange of populations. This is not practical politics yet; it could become practical politics when the war is over if the British believed in it. The Arabs might conceivably go into Transjordan or Iraq, where there is plenty of room; Jews from Europe could come then to Palestine. The idea may seem fantastic, but it worked when imposed by a strong hand on the Greeks and Turks. Something drastic should be done. The refugee issue forces new attention to Zionism as a way out.

ref 2:146

PALESTINE LAND OF PROMISE

BY

WALTER CLAY LOWDERMILK

What of the million and a third Arabs in Palestine and Trans-Jordan? They would benefit greatly from the JVA. The increased Jewish immigration it would make possible would enlarge the market for their produce and provide them with new opportunities for investment and labor. If individual Arabs found that they disliked living in an industrialized land, they could easily settle in the great alluvial plain of the Tigris and Euphrates Valley where there is land enough for vast numbers of immigrants.

ref 2:147

PART II

CHAPTER IV

FIXING THE FRONTIERS

Work will then have to be started in moving Jews out of the Arab state and Arabs out of the Jewish.

When the undoubtedly Arab and undoubtedly Jewish areas had been cleared of all members of the other community, work would begin on deciding the actual frontier, within the limits of the frontier belt. In this area, it would be a question of actually siting the frontier, not merely of assessing compensation.

The two races are in places considerably mixed up in the frontier belt, and as the frontier was settled mile by mile, every effort would be made to arrange exchanges of land and population so as to leave as few people as possible to be compensated for cash.

ref 2:159

Glubb Pasha. A Further Note on Partition

COLONEL R. MEINERTZHAGEN, CBE DSO

MIDDLE EAST DIARY

28.IV.1944. London

Those Arabs who dislike the solution can be compensated and moved elsewhere. It is claimed that this would be a great injustice to the Arabs. The arguments for and against this contention are manifold and interminable. One hears little about injustice to the Jews. Surely a settlement of the Jewish Question, affecting the Jews of the World, is slight injustice to a handful of Arabs who already have a country many hundred times greater than Palestine.

ref 2:153

HEARING BEFORE THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY

January 14, 1946

STATEMENT OF REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MEMBER,
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, CHRISTIAN COUNCIL
ON PALESTINE.

The fact, however, that the Arabs have a vast hinterland in the Middle East, and the fact that the Jews have nowhere to go, establish the relative justice of their claims and of their cause.

Perhaps ex-President Hoover's idea that there should be a large scheme of resettlement in Iraq for the Arabs might be a way out.

ref 2:163



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Baghdad, Iraq, October 2, 1945.

Senator Pepper then said that he had worked out a plan to settle the Zionist question which he believed would be satisfactory to both Arabs and Jews. Senator Pepper's idea was to effect a shift of population, that is, sending all the Jews in Arab countries to Palestine and all the Arabs in Palestine to various Arab countries.

ref 2:166

ARABIAN JUBILEE

by

H. STJ. B. PHILBY

So the solution presented itself to me in three simple, straightforward, comprehensive sentences. The whole of Palestine should be left to the Jews. All Arabs displaced therefrom should be resettled elsewhere at the expense of the Jews, who would place a sum of £20 millions at the disposal of King Ibn Sa'ud for this purpose. All other Asiatic Arab countries, with the sole exception of Aden should be formally recognised as completely independent in the proper sense of the term. These arrangements were to be proposed to King Ibn Sa'ud, as the principal Arab ruler, by Britain and America; and guaranteed jointly by them in the event of their acceptance by him on behalf of the Arabs.

ref 2:169

On Friday, October 6th, ¹⁹³⁹ Dr. Weismann, Mr. Shertok, and myself
X
lunched with Mr. Philby.

Mr. Philby's scheme for settling the Arab-Jewish problem was discussed on the previous lines, and in greater detail. Philby's idea was that Western Palestine should be handed over completely to the Jews, clear of Arab population except for a "Vatican City" in the old city of Jerusalem.

L.B.N.

ref 2:170

Minutes - written by Professor Namier

6.10.39 1. א.א.

הנתיב לה, נתיב דגל, ויניס
 נקודת הנתיב, ונמסר: סניצ'ן דגל, ויניס
 נקודת הנתיב, ונמסר: סניצ'ן דגל, ויניס
 נקודת הנתיב, ונמסר: סניצ'ן דגל, ויניס
 נקודת הנתיב, ונמסר: סניצ'ן דגל, ויניס
 נקודת הנתיב, ונמסר: סניצ'ן דגל, ויניס

ref 2:184 Moshe Shertok (Sharett). Diary entry. 6 October 1939

פרטי - כ ל

ישיבת הוועדה הפוליטית ביום 11. 1939. 8.

משתתפים: ח"ח: ד. בן-גוריון, דב. הוז, י. שפירנסקי, י. בן-אהרן,
 א. ציזלינג, ב. כצנלסון, י. ברץ, מ. נייסט, ש. רייז, א. דובקין, ז. פיינשטיין, ב. ג'ורז, י. לו פכץ, א. קצנלסון, י. קוסוב, א. קפלן, ד. רמז,
 י. בן-צבי, גורדה מאירסון וברל לוקר.

תכנית ה פ י ל ב י . לפילבי היתה שיחה עם
 נמיר ואחר כך עם וייצמן ועם משה, והוא הציע כי השלום בין היהודים
 והערבים יושג על יסודות אלה: מדינה יהודית בכל ארץ-ישראל המערבית;
 טראנספר ערבי מארץ-ישראל למדינות ערביות אחרות; בעד זה ערבים
 היהודים לשלם בכסף מלא - לא רק בשביל החישובות הערבים שיועברו
 מארץ-ישראל, אלא גם באופן שיישאר סכום הגון להתפתחותה של ערב-סעודיה.
 פילבי אמר, שאכן סעודי יש בכוחו לעשות הכל, וכי הוא נוסע עכשיו
 להציע לו הצעה זו. הוא שאל אם אנו יכולים לגייס 20... מיליון פונט.
 משה אמר, כי אין זה דבר כה פשוט, ש-20 מיליון פונט הוא מסבב הגון.
 וייצמן אמר: - אם פילבי יקבל את הסכמתו של אבן סעוד, אזי אלך
 לאמריקה, לרוזוולט, ואומר לו: אם אתה רוצה לפתור את שאלת הפליטים
 היהודים באירופה - עזור לנו לגייס מלווה גדול לסידור זה. אבל
 לפילבי יש עוד תנאי: בעד סידור זה צריכה צרפת לוותר על סוריה,
 וזו צריכה להתאחד עם סוריה. מדוע תעשה זאת צרפת? פילבי איננו יודע.
 אבל נמיר מאמין שזה אפשרי. אחרי המלחמה תעמוד בכל החריפות שאלת
 היהודים באירופה, היא תלחץ גם על צרפת, ומשום כך אפשר יהיה לקבל
 את הסכמתה. מכל מקום חשבנו, כי כדאי הדבר שפילבי ידבר עם אבן סעוד.
 גם ניוקמב איננו מתנגד לכך. מעניין, שמי שמנגד לזה הוא - אחיו של
 לורנס. הוא חושב שפרוגרמה זו, וביחוד הוצאת הערבים מן הארץ הוא דבר
 בלתי אפשרי, אין הוא רוצה להפריע, אבל גם לא יתעסק בדבר.

ref 2:193 Minutes. Mapai Political Committee. 8 November 1939

ס ו ד י מס' 18	סיוסא פרסיכל ישיבת הנהלת הסוכנות היהודית לא"י שנתקיימה בירושלים ביום 26.11.39	341
		מר בן-גוריון:

משרדנו בלונדון עוסק עתה בהכנת חומר הסברה בדבר העברת אוכלוסין. הוא, מר בן-גוריון, איננו מאמין בהעברה מאונס, אבל הוא מאמין שאפשר גם להעביר חלק הערבים מהארץ ברצון.

ref 2:189

Minutes. Jewish Agency Executive

17 נובמבר יום ו'	לונדון.
---------------------	---------

ההנהגה ליזירה. רקיון הסרנסטר שקיבל כבר פילבי לגבי כל מקרה אינני גורם. אינני מאמין בהרשעה כסוי, לא סמני שלא יתכן בכלל, אלא שאנוליה לא תקצה ואת.


ref 2:191

Ben-Gurion. Diary entry. 17 November 1939

<table border="1"> <tr><td>ALL OTHERS</td></tr> <tr><td>CABLE</td></tr> <tr><td>URGENT</td></tr> <tr><td>DEFERRED</td></tr> <tr><td>TELETYPE</td></tr> <tr><td>TELEGRAM</td></tr> </table>	ALL OTHERS	CABLE	URGENT	DEFERRED	TELETYPE	TELEGRAM	<h1>WESTERN UNION</h1> <p>R. B. WHITE PRESIDENT</p> <p>NEWCOMB CARLTON CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD</p> <p>J. C. WILLEVER FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT</p>	1213-D 49 CHECK ACCOUNTING INFORMATION TIME FILED
ALL OTHERS								
CABLE								
URGENT								
DEFERRED								
TELETYPE								
TELEGRAM								
the following message, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to To <u>Philly</u> 6/2 19 80 Street and No. <u>Djedda Saudi Arabia</u> Place I am interested to know whether you are proceeding further as discussed with reference to the same W. Sender's address for reference Sender's telephone number								

ref 2:200

Telegram from Weizmann

	
<small>FROM 112 X 40</small> RECEIVED AT	<small>Tel. ALGOUIN 4-7050</small> 45 E. 17TH STREET
NEW YORK, AT <u>1940 FEB 13 PM 12 45</u> STANDARD TIME <u>43</u>	
BR10 ZA W38 7 3 EXTRA DJEDDAH 12 VIA WASHINGTON DC 13 NO FILING TIME WEIZMANN 111 5TH AVE NEWYORK NY PROGRESSING SLOWLY WRITTEN LONDON PHILBY CFN. 111 5TH.	
TELEPHONE HANOVER 2-1811 <small>To secure prompt action on inquiries, the original RADIOGRAM should be presented at the R. C. A. COMMUNICATIONS, Inc. In telephone inquiries quote the number preceding the plac.</small>	

ref 2:201

21st Feb. 40 (62) 18 Assoc. Rd.
 R. W. 6
 Dear Mr. Mawier (Sorry about the O'!)

I can easily give it to you in paper -
 The scheme has been accepted in prin-
 -ciple & he will think out how it can
 be worked. Meanwhile it is to be
 treated as absolutely confidential,
 as if anything leaked out & got pub-
 -licity, he'd have no hesitation in
 denying the whole thing.

ref 2:202

Donald Mawier

DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS OF STATE		1879
DEPARTMENT OF STATE		
Memorandum of Conversation		
DATE: February 6, 1940		
SUBJECT: Palestine	NOTE: The conversation was begun in Mr. Murray's office but was interrupted to permit Dr. Weizmann to be presented to the Secretary by Mr. Murray. The memorandum is a composite account of Dr. Weizmann's conversation with Mr. Murray and with the Secretary.	
PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Chaim Weizmann; Mr. Murray; Mr. Alling; Mr. Childs.	MR. LONG	
COPIES TO: Eu; Jerusalem; Baghdad; Beirut; Cairo.	Assistant Secretary of State	
	FEB 19 1940	

He added that while in London recently Mr. H. St. J. B. Philby, the great Near Eastern authority and friend of King Ibn Saud, had called on him and had stated that he would like to take back with him to Saudi Arabia some basis of settlement which the King might be willing to support. Dr. Weizmann said that he had remarked to Philby that the only thing the Jews had to offer was money. If an amount of a million pounds was wanted by the King of Saudi Arabia for enlisting his aid in achieving a settlement for Palestine he, Dr. Weizmann, would answer that the price was much too small; if the sum were fifteen or twenty million pounds he would answer that it was beyond hope of realization by the Jews but if the amount were three to four million pounds as the price of the King's support of a scheme whereby the Arabs of Palestine would be voluntarily transferred to Trans-Jordan and Iraq Dr. Weizmann stated that he would prepare to undertake to raise the sum. Philby had promised to convey the offer to the King but Dr. Weizmann had no means of knowing whether anything would come of it.

16th April 4618 Acce Rd.
N.W. 6

Dear Dr. Weizmann

I heard from my husband
yesterday & the following is his answer to your wire -

"Now as for my friend going to America I have had a talk on the subject with Ibn Saud who still won't say yes & won't say no. The truth is that he himself is quite favourably inclined towards the proposal & is just thinking out how it can be worked without producing a host of anger among certain Arab elements."

ref 2:207

Yours sincerely
Dr. Weizmann

NOTE OF INTERVIEW WITH LORD MOYNE, July 28th, 1941.

Dr. Weizmann reported to Lord Moyne on his arrival back in London.

Lord Moyne was pensive for a little while, and then started to speak of a Jewish State. He said that they would have to start with a Federation of Palestine, Transjordan, and Syria; but the formation of such a Federation should be conditional on the creation of a Jewish State. Dr. Weizmann said that this seemed to him to be a line to follow, and told him what the Prime Minister had said to him before his departure for the States. Lord Moyne said that Ibn Saud was a fine man, but he had written some letters which were hostile to Zionist aspirations in Palestine. Dr. Weizmann replied that such an attitude was meant for public consumption; he thought Ibn Saud was a man with whom discussion was possible. He then told Lord Moyne of their talks with Philby. He told Lord Moyne that he believed that the Jews would be willing to advance between fifteen and twenty million pounds to Ibn Saud for development purposes. Lord Moyne had said that some Arabs would have to be transferred, and wondered whether this could be done without bloodshed. Dr. Weizmann said that it could be done if Britain and America talked frankly to the Arabs; they should tell them that they had received 97 cents to the dollar, and that that ought to satisfy them. Lord Moyne said that if transfer were to take place, he would like it to be done without friction. Lord Moyne had then asked: What about the frontier? Dr. Weizmann replied that there was no line except the Jordan Valley. Lord Moyne went on to say that the White Paper would become obsolete, and Dr. Weizmann commented: The sooner the better. Lord Moyne said there were still many matters which he would like to discuss with Dr. Weizmann. He complimented Mr. Namier and Mr. Locker, with whom he said he had had some interesting talks. Dr. Weizmann said he was very happy at the friendly relations which now existed with the Colonial Office.

ref 2:216

Extract from a letter from Lord Moyne to Sir Harold MacMichael dated 6th August, 1941.

Weizmann is hopeful that if an Arab federation is achieved it will be easier to find an accommodation between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. He was rather vague as to details but I understand him to expect federation to come in two stages and that it would not at first include Saudi Arabia. When Syria and Trans-Jordan have achieved independence he hopes that the Arabs might be willing to come to terms with the Jews as the price of the concession of independence to Palestine also. At that stage he believes that Ibn Saud might come in as the head of an enlarged Arab federation. Weizmann talks of a loan of from £15,000,000 to £20,000,000 for the development of Saudi Arabia which might be found by the United States. In return for this Ibn Saud would persuade his fellow Arabs to accept a Jewish enclave (more than a mere token state) in Palestine, displaced Arabs being resettled with Jewish money in Iraq or elsewhere. I believe he got some sort of vague encouragement for his ideas from the Prime Minister some months ago, but I have of course given him no inkling that we have any other idea than the carrying out of the White Paper.

ref 2:217

THE WAR DIARIES OF OLIVER HARVEY

1941

August 7

I am still firmly convinced that Palestine should be a Jewish State as part of an Arab Federation of States if necessary and the Palestine Arabs should be paid to go away.

1942

November 30

I have often talked to A.E. about this but he is hopelessly prejudiced. The Arab myth clouds his mind. The only solution is a Jewish Palestine, which should be a British Palestine, the Arab inhabitants being transferred across the frontier and re-established there. There is plenty of room in Syria, Transjordan, Iraq and Arabia for the Palestine Arabs. There is no solution of the Jewish problem except in Palestine: it is nonsense to talk of Jewish states in Central Europe or Central Africa or Central America. If people would read their history they would understand that.

ref 2:222

SECRET.PRIME MINISTER.

Dr. Weizmann asked me to see Mr. St. John Philby, as the latter could give information regarding Ibn Saud's attitude towards the Palestine question of which Dr. Weizmann wished you to know in view of your remarks before his departure for the United States this summer.

He returned to Arabia shortly after the outbreak of War and early in 1940 discussed the matter with Ibn Saud. The latter was ready to agree to give Palestine to the Jews on condition that as quid pro quo he received control over all the remaining Arab countries. It would also be part of the bargain that the Zionists should pay him a subvention of several million pounds (probably partly in kind, the products of Palestine industry), to be applied, in part, to financing a transfer of Arab population from the Jewish State. On this point Mr. Philby suggested that the transfer would be substantially reduced if the Jews could be persuaded to accept the excision of part of northern Palestine (containing some quarter of a million Arabs), which would naturally go with Syria: they might be compensated if the Egyptians would agree to give up Sinai.

3 November, 1941.

J.M.M.

ref 2:219

Letter. Martin to Churchill

SECRET

5703/32

SHORT MINUTES OF MEETING HELD ON MONDAY, NOVEMBER 23rd, 1942 at the DORCHESTER HOTEL, PARK LANE, LONDON, W.1.

Mr. Sachse said it was not a question of international, but of constitutional, law. He thought they could not consider technique without first considering the question of the present population: were they in favour of transfer of the Arabs either by compulsion or persuasion?

Mr. Sachse said that the problem of minorities was not only a Palestinian problem; it was also an European problem. That being so it would simplify their question. He was prepared to proceed on the basis of compulsory transfer of - say - half a million people.

Mr. Locker said that if they were to talk about compulsory transfer it might lead to Arab disturbances. They might be able to arrange for a partial transfer of population by agreement with Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. But if they had to wait for the consent of the Palestine Arabs he was afraid they would never achieve anything at all. It would not be possible to buy all the Palestine Arabs. He thought they must put the question not as a purely Palestinian problem but as a problem affecting the whole Middle East. He thought that they should endeavour to get the consent of the Great Powers that Palestine should be reserved for the Jews, and then talk to the Arabs on a quid pro quo basis.

Professor Hamer thought they should go straight for a Jewish State. They should concentrate on the Jewish, British and religious interests involved. On the problem of transfer, he agreed with Mr. Philby: it was necessary to have transfer in order to avoid friction. Mr. Philby thought he could get Ibn Saud to agree, if the Arabs were given independence elsewhere. Mr. Bruce Lockhart had thought it would be a good thing if Mr. Philby could produce a memorandum on the subject.

Lord Melchett was opposed to putting forward compulsory transfer.

Mr. Locker said he agreed with Lord Melchett. They were not likely to get it, but they would get the odium of having put it forward. He thought that, with the agreement of Iraq, fairly large numbers of Arabs could be transferred. Iraq was in great need of population.

Professor Hamer asked whether, if they could obtain the memorandum from Mr. Philby dealing with compulsory transfer, they would be able to put it forward without in any way committing themselves?

Lord Melchett thought they should see the memorandum first. In any case it might be important to have such a memorandum. After victory, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt would have so much prestige that they would be able to put across any policy they desired. But even they would not like to do anything in regard to Palestine which would be against the wishes of all the Arab States.

Mr. Burke said they should ask for the establishment of a Jewish State within the British Empire, with reservations in regard to defence and foreign policy. They should also ask for voluntary transfer of Arabs, with financial assistance, to neighbouring Arab States, particularly to Iraq.

Professor Hamer said that in the first instance they should not under-rate the conservation of peasants. But on the other hand there would be so much compulsory transfer of populations in Europe itself that it was bound to affect their problem.

ref 2:229

Minutes. Jewish Agency Executive, London

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE:

January 26, 1943

SUBJECT: Problem of Palestine
 PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Chaim Weizmann;
 Under Secretary, Mr. Welles

Dr. Chaim Weizmann called to see me this morning at his request. He spoke to me of his conversation with Mr. Murray and I told him that Mr. Murray had already informed me of the nature of the conversation which had taken place between them at my suggestion.

I said that I was wholly in favor of Dr. Weizmann proceeding along the lines he had discussed with Mr. Churchill, namely, to proceed to Saudi Arabia in order to discuss with Ibn Saud a solution of the problem of Palestine.

He also envisaged the possibility of granting compensation to such Arabs as desired voluntarily to leave Palestine so that they might resettle in other parts of the Arabian world.

ref 2:233

What a calamitous and infamous miscarriage of justice would, God forbid, result from this world struggle if the Allies should, at the end of their struggle, crown their victory by evicting the Arabs from their home in Palestine, substituting in their place vagrant Jews who have no ties with this country except an imaginary claim which, from the point of view of right and justice, has no grounds except what they invent through fraud and deceit.

ref 2:234

Letter. Ibn Saud to Roosevelt

Minute of Conversation with Hon. Sumner Welles--Under-Secretary of State

Tuesday, June 21, 1943 Washington, D. C.
 Present: Mr. Welles; Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Dr. Stephen S. Wise

Dr. Goldmann said that the memorandum was subjective, one-sided and definitely hostile. Col. Hoskins saw only one aspect of the problem and is rather obsessed with the idea of an Arab revolt, which, for him, is the dominating factor in judging the whole situation. Mr. Welles should not be surprised that he had seen the memo, since it had been sent to many Senators and Congressmen.

Dr. Goldmann asked whether, in view of Col. Hoskins' attitude and in view of the fact that Mr. Welles had mentioned his name to Dr. Weizmann, during the conversation with the President, as one of the candidates to see Ibn Saud to prepare the way for Arab-Jewish discussions, he thought Col. Hoskins the proper person for this assignment. Apart from the fact that he is prejudiced against the Zionist program, should not the person who is sent be of such standing and character as to impress Ibn Saud with his personality. With all due respect to Col. Hoskins, Dr. Goldmann said, he did not seem to have either the necessary standing or calibre.

July, 1943
 Washington, D. C.

ref 2:236

SECRET

5704/

SHORT MINUTES OF MEETING HELD ON TUESDAY, JANUARY 25th, 1944, at 77 GREAT RUSSELL STREET, LONDON, W.C.1.

Present: Dr. Weizmann, Professor Brodetsky, Dr. Goldmann, Mrs. Dugdale, Mr. Locker, Professor Namier, Mr. Linton.

1) PHILBY SCHEME: Professor Namier said that they could still use the Philby Scheme with advantage. The proposal that Palestine should be reserved for the Jews and the Arabs transferred to Transjordan could be utilised as a counter-proposal to partition. He thought that they should propose that an attempt be made to see whether Ibn Sa'ud was still prepared to discuss it. The scheme had never been sufficiently pressed. He thought Ibn Sa'ud might be in favour of it because his work was so far only half done and was not final, since only half of Arabia was under his influence and the other half under foreign influence. Ibn Sa'ud might say that it would be worth while for him if, at the price of Palestine, he were to get a free hand in the rest of Arabia. He was in favour of pressing the scheme without making it dependent on Ibn Sa'ud.

Dr. Weizmann said that the difficulty was that the Prime Minister, who had first made the proposal, had never come back to it; it was very unfortunate. The question was whether they should not bring it to his notice again. He was in favour of the way in which Professor Namier had put the proposal - namely that they should not put Ibn Sa'ud in the forefront of the picture, but rather foster the idea of transfer to Transjordan.

ref 2:255

Minutes. Jewish Agency Executive, London

Ronald Campbell
I enclose a copy of a letter from Jeffries, at the Colonial Office, together with correspondence with Dr. Weizmann. As you will see, Weizmann is still trying to press Philby's fantastic plan for Palestine, involving the buying of Ibn Saud's consent to the giving of the whole of Palestine west of the Jordan to the Jews in return for \$50 million and control of the whole remaining Arab area.

*Yours sincerely,
for signed) Sir M. Peterson.
59/10/44 M. Peterson
(Maurice Peterson)*

Mr Ronald Campbell, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
Washington.

ref 2:257

SECRET

5704/

SHORT MINUTES OF MEETING HELD ON FRIDAY, JANUARY 7th, 1944, at 77 GREAT
RUSSELL STREET, LONDON, W.C.1.

Present: Dr. Weizmann, Mrs. Dugdale, Mr. Locker, Professor
Namier, Mr. Bakstansky, Mr. Linton.

- 3) MR. PHILBY: Professor Namier said that Mr. Philby was depressed because he felt that his scheme was petering out. When he saw him last Mr. Philby had said that their friends were letting them down.

ref 2:258

Minutes. Jewish Agency Executive, London

SECRET

5704/

SHORT MINUTES OF MEETING HELD ON MONDAY, FEBRUARY 7th, 1944 at 77 GREAT
RUSSELL STREET, LONDON, W.C.1.

Present: Dr. Weizmann, Dr. Goldmann, Mrs. Dugdale, Mr. Locker,
Professor Namier, Mr. Bakstansky, Mr. Linton.

- 2) PHILBY SCHEME: Dr. Weizmann said he had lunched with Mr. Philby, who had given him the original Arabic letter from Ibn Saud. A copy of this should be sent to Sir George Gater as soon as it had been photographed.

ref 2:259

Minutes. Jewish Agency Executive, London

12th June, 1944.

Field-Marshal The Right Hon. J.C. Smuts, P.C.,
Hyde Park Hotel,
Knightsbridge, W.C.1.

My dear General

In conclusion, may I remind you of what I said about the Prime Minister's proposal in the early years of the war with regard to a settlement of the Jewish/Palestine problem, and which, curiously enough, coincided with certain ideas of Mr. Philby's? Mr. Philby, as I told you, still regards the scheme as feasible.

ref 2:260

Letter. Weizmann to Smuts

13.5.1939

The re-drawing of frontiers at the end of this war is almost certain to be accompanied by certain transfers of population. A very large part of East and Central European Jewry will by that time have been uprooted to such a degree that it will hardly be deemed practical or advisable to try to re-distribute them to their previous homes, from which, even before the war, their neighbours were anxious to drive them out and they themselves to emigrate. The Jewish problem will therefore come up at the end of the war as a question of re-settling anything between one and four million Jews.

Palestine alone can offer such a solution. From the Jewish point of view the most desirable solution would be to obtain the whole of Palestine west of the Jordan with a programme of transferring ^{of} the Arab population for re-settlement in other Arab countries. For this purpose the Jews could provide the finances, and the transfer would be accompanied with a great improvement in the economic condition of the population transferred and of the countries receiving them.

Should this prove impossible, the next best solution would be a Jewish Palestine within the frontiers suggested by the Peel Commission plus the Negeb, and room for a considerable Jewish settlement in Jersrah. This would imply much smaller transfers of Arab population.

ref 2:270

A.D.
LBN.